

**PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS
GLOBAL STRATEGY DISCUSSIONS**

4 June 1956

In reviewing the world situation this morning I will deal generally at first with the political and economic aspects and will then give the military picture as we know it. Of course I well know -- in fact, we stress here at the War College -- that the political and the military are so interrelated that they should not be thought of separately. This is particularly true in the day of the nuclear weapon which certainly casts a heavy shadow on the whole political, and many other, situations.

There is definitely a limit to the coverage I can give to the world situation in the time allowed so I will confine myself to aspects of the situation which are most significant to the United States.

I consider that the aspects most important to us can be classified under three broad headings: those which stem from the dynamic and aggressive communist drive for world domination; those involved in maintaining a strong and viable Western coalition; and a third group, lying between the other two and complicating them both very materially, which I shall classify as the problems created by nationalism. In looking back to my talk on this subject last year I can see that what has changed since then is not the problems themselves, but rather the context within which their solution must be sought. The cold war is still going on, at an unabated pace, but the international atmosphere has altered greatly. This has been mostly brought about by the new actions and attitudes of the Communists.

I think it's fair to say that the over-all flavor of the first post-war decade -- Phase I in the cold war -- was primarily a military one. Even our great foreign aid program, while it had its humanitarian features, was basically designed to contribute to our national security. Stalin's tactics confronted the West with an obvious, somber, and immediate military threat; the major portion of our national effort, and that of our Allies, was devoted to coping with that threat.

Paradoxically, it was just this military threat that proved to be the essential element which bound the Western coalition tightly together. I think Stalin himself was beginning to realize this fact before he died. At any rate, the new management which took over the Kremlin after Stalin's death was not slow to see this point, and to act on it. The west was obviously more unified, and much stronger politically and militarily, than it would have been had it not been terrorized into collective action. As a result, NATO had been followed by ANZUS, ANZUS by SEATO; and we had entered into a number of bi-lateral mutual defense agreements all around the world.

As a result of these developments, the West achieved a high degree of political unity, and a reasonably good defense posture. This I am sure is what forced the Reds into the spectacular apparent reversal of policy which we've witnessed in the last few months. They seem to have decided that it would be less costly in the long run to cause the downfall of the Western coalition by undermining and weakening its structure, than it would be to attempt to push it down, at this time, by sheer force.

Whatever their reasoning may have been, the fact remains that in this last year the Soviets have brought out into the clear what looks like one of the greatest about-face maneuvers of all time.

Before going further, I should like to make one thing completely clear. I've pointed several times to a change in Soviet policy and tactics. I do not want this to be taken as any indication that I feel there is any change in communist objectives. These are clearly unchanged. Khrushchev himself has been frank enough to tell us so: you recall, I'm sure, his remark that "If anyone believes our smiles involve abandonment of the teachings of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, he deceives himself. Those who wait for that will have to wait until a shrimp learns to whistle!"

I've seen nothing which would make me suppose that the communist leaders have abandoned their fundamental objective of world domination. To accomplish this, they must do several things, which can be regarded either as subordinate objectives or policies, depending on how you look at them: they must first weaken, and then break down, the free-world coalition, and isolate the United States. Eventually, they must eliminate this country as a world power. To the Red leaders, we are the ultimate enemy -- the real target, and we must never forget this. In the meantime, a major Soviet objective appears to be to gain time to build up and maintain the political, economic, and military strength of the communist bloc in order to assure their own security and survival.

Even allowing for the diversity of views undoubtedly represented in an audience as large as this one, I feel sure there will be pretty general agreement with what I've just said. Accordingly, it's the methods by which the enemy seeks to achieve these objectives that are of most interest to us today. These have changed very radically this last year. After a decade of what might be called international banditry, the newly cleaned up Kremlin is preaching peace and international understanding. It's conducting bi-lateral and multi-lateral negotiations and attending

international conferences; it's exchanging high-level visits with all sorts of countries, and extending financial and economic aid to needy nations. Peaceful co-existence is their current watchword. All this, of course, is in the greatest contrast to their technique in Phase I.

I believe this policy shift is more than a temporary maneuver. A revolutionary change in traditional communist dogma was rammed down the throats of the delegates to the 20th Communist Party Congress in Moscow early this year. The inevitability of war between the rival social and political systems was rejected. They now say it is possible that a nation's conversion to the communist system could come as the result of normal political and parliamentary processes; violent revolution is no longer considered essential. Even Tito's variety of national communism is now accepted as legitimate and the cominform -- ostensibly, at least -- has been done away with. A lot of old communists must have turned over in their graves, but the delegates to the Party Congress didn't argue; they just agreed.

I think one of the most remarkable and probably significant developments is the de-Stalinization of the Soviet Union, and its satellites. This attack on the "cult of personality" and the dictator's errors was a very bold step indeed. Stalin had the status of a demi-god; he, his dictates, and his memory were literally everywhere in the Soviet social, political, economic, and military structure. Stalin -- the Leader -- was infallible. To destroy this legend of infallibility of the leadership was obviously something that involved potentially dangerous repercussions which must have been very carefully weighed before this campaign was initiated.

To me, the most significant thing about these radical developments is that they

were undertaken as a matter of deliberate choice. These actions are very far-reaching in their effects; they are not the sort of thing that would be done lightly, or simply to facilitate a short-term tactical maneuver. These are shock-tactics, and the men who employed them must be very sure of their own position. They are not fools, and they must consider the goal is worth whatever gamble is involved.

It is, I think, not difficult to see that these recent moves all support the attainment of the objectives -- the long-term goals -- which I discussed a minute ago. It was fear, essentially, which cemented and strengthened the Western coalition in Phase I. No other compulsion is as strong. If the factors which created the need for self-protection disappear, the bonds of alliances are inevitably weakened. That is the essence of the new Soviet strategy. Instead of threats, the Soviets are now fostering in the Western peoples hope that war can, after all, be avoided, that accommodation can be achieved by negotiation on all our outstanding problems. They are making the future seem less frightening. This is a very pleasant theme in contrast to the old one. A great many people are in a very receptive mood, and the positive appeal of this new line is apt to be much more effective from the Soviet viewpoint than the essentially negative pressures which they used before. The Soviet announcement, about a month ago, that they intended to demobilize 1,200,000 men was a master-stroke of propaganda in support of this new theme.

Here, of course, lies much of the difficulty for NATO in particular, and, in varying degree, our other military alliances around the world. NATO, though, is the foundation stone of our foreign policy, and that of its other members. There is general agreement still, among the Allied governments, that although the methods used by the enemy may have changed, the real threat to our security has not diminished

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The Soviets still want West Germany out of NATO; they still want to weaken NATO by playing up old Western rivalries like that between France and Germany; they still want American troops withdrawn from the Continent. These are their real targets in Europe, and we can be sure they are always aiming at them. The time has not yet come when we can let NATO, or our general military posture, wither on the vine. I consider also that we must be constructing new policies and new techniques to stop, and then roll back, this new Soviet offensive.

We would be foolish indeed if we did not recognize that NATO's troubles are on the increase. Primarily a military alliance, it is inadequate, in its present form, to cope with the new Soviet political and economic drives. The easing of Red pressure, too, has permitted old Western European rivalries to rise to the surface again, and sow the seeds of disunity in the West.

NATO's difficulties are also due, very importantly, to the growing complacency of the Western public, particularly in Western Europe, as the danger of actual hostilities appears to decline. There has been a strong, latent, fear on the part of the public in Western Europe of becoming involved in a nuclear war. This fear has been a serious handicap to the strengthening of NATO. In addition to this psychological factor, the continued budgetary difficulties of most of the governments involved have placed definite limitations on their ability to contribute to the strengthening of NATO's military potential. There's been decreasing public support in these countries for continued high-level defense expenditures, particularly since the new Soviet "peace" drive developed. In Germany, there's a large body of opinion which would be willing to buy re-unification at the price of neutrality.

Adenauer is still firm, but he's not quite as strong, either physically or politically, as he was a year or two ago. We still have no guarantee that the German contribution to NATO will be made within the scheduled period.

In France, continuing reverses in the colonial field, and the chaotic internal political situation, have been affecting the continuity and soundness of French foreign policy. They've been leading, too, I think, to a growing feeling of frustration on the part of the French public. This has definite dangers: the desire for firmer political direction might find expression in support for a popular front form of government. It's worth remembering that the largest single bloc of votes in the French Assembly is controlled by the communists. Meantime, with the commitment of the bulk of her forces in North Africa, France has left only a token force under the command of SACEUR.

Another problem for the West, and for NATO, is found in the continued economic and financial difficulties of several Western nations, particularly the United Kingdom. Despite the aid we've extended, and despite her austerity program, which has continued since the war, Britain is still suffering from internal inflation and serious balance of payment deficits, which may well be complicated by the forth coming granting of a large measure of autonomy to Malaya, the largest single earner of dollars for the Commonwealth dollar pool. This puts an added premium on Britain's valuation of her Near East oil resources, which are vital to her status as a world power. This, in turn, greatly complicates the ability of the Western nations to arrive at a unified policy in the Near East.

These factors which I've been discussing are only a few of those at work in the West which limit our capacity to work together efficiently. Any disunity is a dangerous flaw in the Western structure. The enemy works with a singleness of purpose which

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the Western nations, with their democratic systems and their often conflicting national interests, cannot match. Treachery, deceit, and subversion are powerful weapons when used by a ruthless state such as the Soviet Union or Communist China against opponents whose principles preclude retaliation in kind. They're still using these weapons, although for the time being less overtly than before. And they haven't retreated an inch on any of the problems in Europe, or elsewhere for that matter, which are really important to them. They're still working on their major objectives everywhere.

The junior partners, the Communist Chinese, haven't been making any concessions either. In some ways, I think, they constitute an even more dangerous enemy than the Soviets in the sense that they are more apt to act on a purely emotional and unreasoning basis, and are more arrogant in their attitude. They've shown little capacity or willingness to understand the West.

They've quieted down a good deal in the last year or so, but they've continued to work busily on the complex of new jet airfields back of Quemoy and Matsu, and on the road and rail communications in the area. Their present quietness may be simply in line with the new Soviet policy, but there are probably other factors behind it, too.

One of these, I'm pretty sure, is their desire to have Nationalist China's seat in the United Nations and with it, wider international diplomatic recognition. We, of course, are firmly opposed -- very strongly opposed -- to their representing China in the UN, or to diplomatic recognition. There is, though, an extremely serious problem which stems from the fact that many of our allies, and most of the neutralist nations, oppose our stand on these questions.

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Thus far, from year to year, by persuasion, bargaining, and pressure, we've managed to have the China issue deferred in the UN each time the Soviet representative introduced his annual resolution, but this has become increasingly difficult. Pressure is building up in the UN in favor of seating the communists; this was considerably strengthened at the last session by Nationalist China's threat to veto the admission of Outer Mongolia.

We may succeed in staving this off again at the next session, or we may not. If we don't, and if we should be defeated on this question, it would have a most serious effect on our country's attitude towards the UN.

Although the threat of imminent trouble in the Far East appears less than it was last year, the situation there is still far from satisfactory from our point of view. The area as a whole is fragmented politically into a heterogeneous collection of weak states, many of them new and inexperienced, plagued with economic and financial problems, and with little or no defense potential. The defeat of Japan left a political vacuum which the Chinese Communists are trying hard to fill.

In Korea and Vietnam we still have only armistice agreements, which do nothing to solve the basic issues in dispute. In the Formosa area, the situation is even more delicate: there's only a very informal and tenuous cease-fire there, which is frequently violated. Any one of these situations could alter for the worse over-night.

However, our commitments in the area, through SEATO and our various bi-lateral defense treaties, have drawn some pretty definite lines beyond which the communists must know they cannot pass, by force, without causing serious

trouble. The same, of course, is true in Europe; the lines there are even more definitely drawn.

This, perhaps, is one of the very good reasons why the present communist strategy is to by-pass these strong points, and hit us where it's hardest for us to retaliate effectively. I have in mind, of course, the new Soviet political and economic offensive in the Middle East and South Asia.

Even aside from this question of the new Soviet intervention, this area suffers from a number of indigenous, interlocking, and complex problems which practically defy solution. Basic in the whole unhappy situation, of course, is the Arab-Israel dispute, which seems as nearly insoluble as any in the world today. As a nation, I think, we have a very sympathetic understanding of the desire of the Zionists for a refuge from persecutinn -- for security and a chance to carve out their own future. We cannot but admire their energy and resourcefulness, and their readiness to make personal and national sacrifices to achieve their goals. On the other hand, we can understand the viewpoint of the Arabs, too. It was their lands that were expropriated, and their people who lost their homes, in what they regard as an alien invasion. Both parties are so involved emotionally, and so committed by their leaders' statements, that they are psychologically unable to give way. The recent mission of UN Secretary Dag Hammerskjold to the Near East, although technically successful under the terms of his directive, dealt only with the symptoms of this illness -- it did nothing to effect a cure.

The existence of an irreconcilable dispute in a weak and chaotic area in which the West had been losing ground steadily for years, made this the perfect

spot for Soviet intervention. The Kremlin had little to lose, and much to gain, in selling arms to Egypt. They hit us and the British where they knew it would hurt, and at very small cost to themselves. From their viewpoint, Israel is undoubtedly expendable.

By strengthening Egypt, they also struck a heavy blow at the Baghdad Pact, of which Iraq, Egypt's rival for Arab leadership, is a key member. This so-called "Northern Tier" defense treaty was signed at just about the time of the new Soviet shift in tactics. This has proved to be a psychological handicap to the members, and had tended to lessen the interest of other Arab nations in joining it. Nasser, driven by ambition and the necessities of his political position at home, has chosen Israel, the British, and the Baghdad Pact as the prime targets of his nationalist crusade, and the identity of his interests with those of the Soviet Union has made him a willing hatchet-man for the Kremlin in the Near East. He's capitalized very effectively on Soviet support, and has set up, with Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, and Now Jordan, an Arab "defense" organization which looks much more viable than the old Arab League ever was.

In the meantime, the French have lost much ground in North Africa, and the British have been driven steadily back in an area which is of the greatest strategic and economic importance to them. They're seriously concerned over the threat to their communications through this region, and their loss of prestige in an area in which they had been paramount for generations. They're even more concerned at the threat to the petroleum resources upon which their economy -- and for that matter, Europe's as well -- is dangerously dependent. If they are pushed much

further in the Near East, the British might resort to more forceful action in defense of their interests there. If they should, it would obviously do nothing to ease the situation, which is already hard enough to handle, as it is. Despite our basic agreement on ultimate objectives in the Near East, we and the British still differ widely on some of the tactical problems.

Judging by our own actions in the area in recent years, it seems clear that we consider it in our own best interests, and that of our allies, to avoid direct involvement on either side of the area's disputes if we can. The position of a mediator is seldom an enviable one, but we can obviously exert a greater moderating influence than we could if we were firmly committed in any given dispute. This in-between position undoubtedly leaves a good many people dissatisfied, as being insufficiently definite and firm. I am sure you will give this a great deal of attention during your discussions. Reflection on the results of our taking a firm position -- with the British against the eight Arab states, or with the Arabs against the British, or with Israel against the Arabs or vice versa -- and picturing the possible reactions of the Soviet Union in any of these situations, will probably throw considerable light on the reasons underlying present U.S. policy. It is entirely possible, of course, that our hand could be forced.

In this Near East area, as well as in Asia, one of our greatest and most difficult problems is found in the spirit of nationalism, which I mentioned at the beginning of this talk. Nationalism, like Communism, is not a new problem. It's been the driving force behind the great colonial revolution which has taken

place in our lifetimes. The history of our own country makes us fundamentally sympathetic to the concepts of independence, freedom, and self-determination of peoples, all of which are components of the thing we're talking about. Nationalism, when it's based on sound concepts and intelligently guided towards sound objectives, is a fine thing. When it's blind, unreasoning, ruthless, and fanatical, though, as it is so often today, it can be a very dangerous thing, working to the detriment of the very peoples who expect to enjoy its benefits. This is particularly true when it's subverted by the communists and made to serve their ends.

In this last year or so, these movements have taken on greatly increased importance; the drive for independence is much more powerful now than it has ever been before. The utilization of this force to serve their own ends in the Near East and Asia is, I believe, a key feature of the diplomatic and economic offensives which the communists have launched in this area in recent months.

The essence of the recent vitalization of this force, I think, lies in the fact that the nationalist and anti-colonial elements in Asia and Africa have finally realized that, although they're weak individually, they can nevertheless exert a very considerable influence on the stronger powers if they act in concert. The 24 Afro-Asian states which met at Bandung, in Indonesia, something over year ago, are divided by race, religion, and

widely differing concepts and interests in many fields. They found, though, that they shared a common hatred of colonialism, and a common desire not to become involved with either of the two great power-blocs in the cold war. This nationalism is a compound of anti-colonialism and neutralism in the newly independent countries of the area.

Their newly-discovered strength was first tested in the United Nations last year, when they forced the temporary withdrawal of the French delegation from the General Assembly. With the admission of some 14 new members to the UN last year, many of them belonging to this same new nationalist bloc, the likelihood that this same sort of difficulty will recur in the future is greatly enhanced.

The colonial possessions which had still not achieved their independence made another discovery, too. They found that the colonial powers had no really effective short-term defense against the power of sheer emotionalism. Mobs rioted in Tunis, and Tunisia was granted its independence. ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~
~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ Mobs rioted in Morocco, with the same results. Mobs rioted in Algeria, and the repressive measures instituted in desperation by the French have resulted only in continuing disorder. In Cyprus, the emotional drive for union with Greece has presented a major

problem to the British, the Greeks, the Turks, and to NATO, and no satisfactory solution seems yet to be in sight. The situation which has developed in Singapore looks even worse. Reason and common sense seem unimportant today; emotionalism has full sway.

The great powers, who are our chief partners in the free-world coalition, and whose strength is essential to us if our concept of collective security is to survive, are undergoing a process of slow attrition, with the end not yet in sight.

These basically indigenous forces of nationalism, neutralism, and anti-colonialism have been given added importance and power in recent months by the active Soviet political and economic campaigns in the Middle East and Asia. This has put the neutralist bloc countries in a most strategic position. The intense interest displayed by the communist bloc in this vast region in the last few months has enabled these countries to play off one side against the other to their own advantage, and they've not been slow to do this. Our whole foreign aid policy needs -- and, actually, is getting -- a thorough overhauling in the light of these new circumstances.

Here the United States encounters a most difficult problem. Any increase in communist influence in this neutral area decreases our influence proportionately, but our endeavors to maintain or improve our position are fundamentally handicapped by our close association with the former colonial powers, hated by

the nationalists, but essential to us under our policy of collective security. We run head-on into this deeply ingrained feeling of anti-colonialism at every turn, and every attempt on our coalition relationships. The Reds enjoy a very important advantage in this competition: they're not regarded by the Near Eastern or Asian states as being tainted with the stigma of colonial rule.

The problems I've discussed up to this point have been of two types: those related to the cold war in one way or another, and those involving forces, like nationalism, which don't owe their origin to cold war factors, but which are greatly complicated by them. In terms of urgency, and fundamental interest to our national security, however, they're all subordinate to one other problem which I've only mentioned by implication thus far.

This over-riding problem relates to the real intentions of the communist hierarchy. They say their aim is peace, and competitive co-existence. They could mean this -- as a very practical matter, and not because of any moral scruples on their part -- or they could intend this simply as a palatable delusion for the West and the neutral area, designed to weaken both, psychologically and militarily, and so facilitate the ultimate take-over.

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It is therefore inescapable that we must keep in mind the ever increasing communist military power in terms of this capability to wage either conventional warfare or nuclear warfare. The recent widely publicized Soviet reduction of 1,200,000 troops made for effective propaganda but of course did not cause a significant reduction of modern communist striking power. Because of this ever-present military threat, a review of some of the military aspects of the situation is appropriate.

As you know, the Russian Army is the largest and most powerful land force in the world. It has been modernized with new equipment and new tactical doctrine to adapt it to nuclear warfare. When combined with communist satellite forces it is given the capability of rapidly conquering Europe in a non-nuclear war. You'll recall that General Gruenther has said this and also that upon his recommendation the NATO Council authorized the basing of NATO defense plans on U.S. atomic weapons. This is a concept that has been debated on the one hand as one which may lose more than it gains and on the other as the only solution to European military defense. As the USSR reaches a condition of atomic plenty similar to our own I would suspect that this concept would provide further substance for heated discussion.

The Soviet Navy is now second only to our own. While we predominate significantly in combatant surface ships the Russians have almost four times as many submarines and their rate of production is much greater than ours. It has been reported that all large shipyards in the Soviet Union are engaged exclusively in naval construction.

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We've had remarkable success with our nuclear powered submarine, so we expect that the Russians are striving hard in that direction. Nuclear submarines, with their ability to stay submerged for months, their greatly reduced underwater noise level and with underwater speeds which permit them to overtake almost every type of surface ship are truly revolutionizing submarine warfare. Since many millions of ton-miles of over water logistics would be required to support our bases and operations overseas in time of an extended war, the prospect of confronting an enemy with ~~SIX OR EIGHT~~ times as many submarines as the Germans had at the beginning of World War II is a vitally serious one.

By 1960 there will be an estimated ~~500~~ ^{550 LONG RANGE} submarines in the Russian Fleet and some may be nuclear. ~~AS MANY AS~~ 200 long range types ~~could be cruising~~ throughout the Atlantic and to the shores of the United States, and we expect some to be fitted with nuclear guided missiles with which to attack congested coastal areas. We know the Soviet naval leaders have spoken in the press about the desirability of such a weapons system. To show you how we feel about the possibilities of the guided missile submarine, we believe that three such boats, each fitted with six missiles of the Regulus type carrying hydrogen-bomb type war-heads could heavily damage key Soviet port installations along the Barents Sea, the Baltic Sea, and the Black Sea. Three similar submarines, operating against our own East Coast might paralyze about thirty percent of our port capacity and cause on the order of ten million casualties. These estimates are based on weapons and weapons systems we have already tested and found to be feasible.

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The Soviet Navy includes a modern Naval Air Arm equipped with more than 3000 modern aircraft for use off shore and in conjunction with submarines or surface ships. Most of these are jet aircraft with a radius of action of about 1200 miles. There are also considerable numbers of fast jet torpedo planes within this category. It was reported recently that the naval air force is now getting a few TU4 long range bombers which are being phased out of the Soviet Long Range Air Command. This means that the Naval Air arm can carry out long range reconnaissance from Russian territory to the shores of NEWFOUNDLAND ~~and return~~ and return. The capability may be continually increased and you can readily appreciate the problem such general surveillance of the North Atlantic would pose if unhindered.

Now - as to the Soviet Air Force proper. Added to it, of course, must come the Air Force of the Soviet Navy I have just mentioned. Together, these constitute a formidable threat both to continental United States and to our forces, bases, and allies abroad. We know the Russian Air Forces are good. We also know that they are numerous. I should think, however, that in the overall view we probably still retain somewhat of a lead in air power if all of our components, the U.S. Air Force and Naval Aviation, are given their due weight. A big factor, of course, is quality - quality of training, of men, and of equipment. I want to underline that word quality. It is generally agreed that we should not try to match Russia man for man. Rather, we must have outstanding quality in our military establishment. This particularly means quality of manpower and training as well as quality of materials.

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We fight a strenuous battle to attain quality in manpower. Under today's conditions we have great difficulty in getting young people interested in the military as a career. As one example, the Strategic Air Command--a major deterrent force -- is in constant difficulty from a manpower standpoint. And to give you another example, last year one of our aircraft carriers, with a normal crew of 1500 had a turnover of 1700 people. On the other hand the communist powers, with controlled low standards of general living are able to put military life on a pedestal. This qualitative challenge is one which Western nations with high standards of living can meet only if they are willing to make the necessary sacrifice.

The situation with regard to our bases deserves careful consideration.

As the British, French, and Dutch colonial empires melt away, new problems in this respect are created for the Western nations. If Singapore, 85 percent Chinese becomes autonomous, or if it joins Malaya when the latter achieves its independence, will its great naval base be available to the British, and to us, in time of need? The new government which swept unexpectedly into power last April in Ceylon is opposed to foreign bases on the island; how long will Trincomalee be available to the British, and to us? The Icelandic parliament has gone on record as favoring the withdrawal of our forces from their country. How secure are the four American air bases in a newly independent Morocco? The British have completed the evacuation of their Suez base under their agreement with the revolutionary government of Egypt, which may or may not choose to honor its agreement to re-admit the British if any of the Arab nations should be attacked by a foreign power.

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If you'll look at a world map and mentally place a question mark over each British or American French overseas base whose status is either actually or potentially in doubt, I think you'll agree with me that there's much to worry over in this part of our military preparedness.

Now a word about Russian industry. - Not so long ago there was skepticism that Russian industry could ever compare with ours, especially in quantity and quality production. I think we have been disabused of wishful thinking on this score since we have discovered outstanding engineering in captured Russian aircraft and since we saw Russia's ability to produce heavy jet bombers. Furthermore, German scientists returning from the Russian aircraft factories say that whereas Russian consumer goods in general are inferior, this is not the case in military goods.

We acknowledge that the Russian Air Force has the capability to strike the United States with nuclear weapons and that Russian industry can support this effort. We don't think their intercontinental air strike capability is quite as good as our own, but with the meager intelligence we have we must not under-rate them. We have been mistaken on a number of counts in the last few years.

There has been much recent speculation about intercontinental ballistic missiles. We must unceasingly work to perfect these weapons because we know the enemy is heavily engaged in their development. Although Krushchev spoke threateningly to the British about a Russian missile fitted with a nuclear warhead, I am inclined to lean toward the theory that the piloted airplane will remain the most accurate and dependable method of delivering expensive

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weapons directly to a target area for a considerable number of years.

At the present state of the art, formidable obstacles remain to be overcome before Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles are operational. Even after they become operational they should not be able to compete in accuracy and versatility with the aircraft guided by man. However, in order to guarantee retaliation under any and all circumstances of attack, we must develop the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile and do it first if possible.

In this connection, the shorter range 1500 mile missile can be expected to be developed in the relatively near future. This weapon could be used from our overseas bases -- and above all it would be adapted to shipboard use. Because ships can choose their launching positions, completion of this missile will enhance the already considerable offensive power of the navy, and thus will serve to supplement the intercontinental missile -- and to bridge the time period before it, the intercontinental version, becomes operational.

As I pointed out earlier we have today a vast area of nations which are politically, economically and militarily unstable. Some are carefully maintaining neutralism - some are actively supported by the East or the West. This twilight area of nations and peoples is an area where the cold war might well warm up. Some of this area is a possible ground for limited wars and, if serious miscalculations are made by either side, might well provide the spark that sets off a general war. At the moment we are anxiously watching North Africa and the Middle East. Maybe in the next few months our worry will increase over South and/or South East Asia.

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China certainly bears careful watching. The Chinese Communist Army is almost exactly the size of the Army of the USSR. The military strength of China is growing thanks to military assistance from the USSR. With such power in the hands of impetuous leaders we must maintain our readiness in the Far East.

We are in a period in our relations with the Russians and Chinese in which to prevent war we must prepare mightily for it. We must maintain such a state of military strength that any attack upon us would obviously result in bringing unacceptable destruction to the attacker.

In summary, I would list the following as salient features of the present world military situation:

1. The tremendous increase of the destructive nature of military weapons and the advances in means to deliver the weapons.
2. The probability that there will be little opportunity to mobilize resources after the outbreak of war.
3. Developments in aircraft, missiles, and submarines which have ended the invulnerability of the Western Hemisphere.
4. The wide range of possible conflicts and the multitude of different threats that the present world situation presents to United States and free world security, ranging from the twilight area problems, to cold war, limited war, and global war.

These salient features, I think, generate problems that you will want to talk about during the coming week.

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Although the Kremlin leaders have now denounced Stalin, they continually reaffirm their adherence to Marx and Lenin. Their writings are far from secret and are as ominous and revealing as was Hitler's book *Mein Kampf*. They clearly state that communism must dominate the world. Until this dogma of world conquest is renounced and backed up by convincing proof and performance as well as the unmistakable raising of the iron curtain, we who stand for the freedom and dignity of the individual remain the enemies that communism is committed to destroy.

We have very definite strengths. The enemy has very difficult problems of his own. The present situation, difficult as it is for us, is not one-sided, by any means. I am confident that if we are willing to keep up our guard against the underlying as well as the obvious threats the basic right and justice of our position will win for us.

We must always be conscious of the fact, however, that freedom is not free. It can be had in these troubled times only at a price -- the price of constant vigilance the price of military readiness - and the willingness to carry the burden of responsibility in world affairs which our great strength has thrust upon us.

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